I. INTRODUCTION
Ordinarily, individual shareholders are immune from liability arising from a corporation's activities through the doctrine of limited liability.
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LIMITING JUDICIAL DISCRETION 193 categorizations and classifications of its various incarnations. Part II further reviews each state's classifications of the piercing doctrine, ultimately finding the traditional classifications are generally lip service used to mask an unguided, and inconsistently applied, factors test. Part III of this Article explains the importance of establishing guidelines for the doctrine's use that will promote the goals of consistency and predictability. Part IV of this Article discusses four remedies other scholars have advocated to alleviate the doctrine's predictability concerns. Part IV further discusses the deficiencies of each of those proposals. Finally, Part V argues jurisdictions can cabin the doctrine through the introduction of a four-part conjunctive test. First, the proposed test requires an injustice prong, compelling plaintiffs to demonstrate the corporation engaged in fraud, engaged in misrepresentation, or undercapitalized the corporation. Special emphasis is provided to the element of undercapitalization and a novel method of generating an objective test for determining undercapitalization. Ultimately, the Article advocates adopting the tort doctrine of custom as a mechanism to contain the discretion otherwise rampant in undercapitalization determinations. Second, the proposed test requires an objective unity element that is premised upon control over the decision-making process. This element dispenses with the notion of seeking to determine which shareholder has corporate unity and instead focuses the piercing analysis on which shareholder or shareholders have unity with the decision giving rise to liability. Third, the proposed test requires a causal element, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the inequitable conduct gave rise to the plaintiff's harm. This element incorporates but-for causation and proximate causation into the piercing test. Finally, the proposed test requires an insolvency element, requiring plaintiffs to prove the corporation is insolvent to pay the plaintiffs' damages.
II. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE PIERCING DOCTRINE
Limited liability is a bedrock feature of corporate law 10 for it encourages diversification and liquidity, 11 promotes market efficiency, 12 10. See 45 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Corporations § 1, at 7 (1998) ("A fundamental principle of Anglo-American law is that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders. . . . This concept of limited liability has been called the most attractive feature of the corporation. . . . and must therefore be credited with a significant role in the industrial revolution and the subsequent development of global economy.") 11. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 490-91; John P. and decreases the need for monitoring agents and officers. 13 Although the origins of limited liability are unclear and have become the subject of scholarly debate, 14 it is clear that limited liability began in the United States as a fairly rare event achieved through an individual act of the legislature for special, usually infrastructural projects. 15 That changed with the Industrial Revolution, and by the 1840s, the majority of jurisdictions in the United States had adopted some form of limited liability for incorporated entities, embracing the notion that limited liability would encourage investment as well as increase competitiveness in business markets. 16 With the growth of limited liability as a statutory 12. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 490-91; Glode, supra note 11, at 134; Huss, supra note 3, at 105; Millon, supra note 8, at 1312; Posin, supra note 11, at 314-15; Reed, supra note 11, at 1646.
13. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 490-91; Huss, supra note 3, at 105; Millon, supra note 8, at 1313; Morrissey, supra note 5, at 536-41; Posin, supra note 11, at 314-15; Reed, supra note 11, at 1647.
14. Rutherford B. Campbell, Limited Liability for Corporate Shareholders: Myth or Matter-ofFact, 63 KY. L.J. 23, 24 (1975) .
15. See Morrissey, supra note 5, at 534. 16. Huss, supra note 3, at 103-04; see also Morrissey, supra note 5, at 534 ("As the industrial revolution began in earnest in the U.S. around 1825, businesses began to need capital from widespread investors. At that time, corporate statutes first started providing limited liability for shareholders."). norm, courts began to recognize situations where limited liability created inequitable results, and, as a reaction, developed the piercing doctrine. 17 Theoretically, the piercing doctrine is nothing more than a judicially created equitable remedy, 18 permitting plaintiffs to look beyond an entity's limited liability when the entity or its owners have failed to behave in a manner consistent with legitimate corporate institutions. 19 The rub, of course, has always been in determining what circumstances constitute a failure to act legitimately. 20 While the courts have generated various tests to determine under what circumstances a corporation is not acting legitimately, very little consensus exists. 21 Furthermore, while scholars have attempted to organize the tests into concrete categories, the similarities of those tests tend to overshadow their differences. Specifically, various scholars and courts have denominated three types of tests 22 -the alter ego test, 23 the instrumentality test, 24 and the injustice or 18. Although limited liability exists statutorily for incorporated entities in every jurisdiction in the United States, the piercing doctrine is not a legislative exception to most of those statutes. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1041 ("Almost all state corporations statutes simply ignore the whole idea of piercing the corporate veil."). Furthermore, the piercing doctrine is not an independent legislative construct in most United States jurisdictions. Morrissey, supra note 5, at 542 ("State statutes typically provide limited liability for shareholders unqualified by any reference to [the piercing doctrine]."). Instead, the piercing doctrine is a judicial exception created through the court's equity powers. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.5.1, at 70 (2000) 35. Caudill, supra note 23, at 467 ("Reverse piercing occurs when a court holds a controlled corporation, which has been misused as the alter ego or instrumentality of a shareholder, liable for the debts of that controlling shareholder.").
36. Id. at 469 ("Triangular piercing occurs when a controlled corporation is held liable for the debts of an affiliated corporation, through an intermediary controlling shareholder. The liability flows in a triangle, first from the controlled corporation to the controlling shareholder, then from the controlling shareholder to the affiliated corporation.").
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A. Tort Versus Contract Cases
While the separation between tort and contract theories in ordinary litigation can sometimes prove difficult, 37 courts have routinely viewed the two as finitely distinct in both the application of piercing and its theory. 38 The separation of tort and contract, as it applies to piercing theory, stems from perceived choice of the parties. 39 That is, in tort cases, the plaintiff does not necessarily choose to engage in a relationship with the defendant. 40 Rather, in many cases that relationship is thrust upon the plaintiff. 41 In contrast, contract cases are ordinarily the result of two or more bargaining parties who each possess the power to investigate one another prospectively before entering the relationship.
42
While this distinction seems somewhat irrelevant in a vacuum, its theoretical underpinning makes sense, if nowhere else, when discussing the injustice element of the piercing doctrine.
The injustice element in the piercing doctrine stems from the doctrine's historical roots. That is, the piercing doctrine evolved as a judicial, equitable response to the perceived-or actual-unfairness that could result from the application of strict limited liability statutes. 43 Thus, notwithstanding the mandates of limited liability, courts have permitted plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil in circumstances where permitting the defendant to hide behind the black letter of the law would be unjust-the defendant has engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or undercapitalization. 44 In this context, the theoretical notion of choice plays a significant role because it defines what level of injustice could have existed between the parties and, thus, how rigorously the court will enforce the discretion of equity jurisdiction. 45 For example, in the context of fraud, one party to a contract can investigate another before entering the relationship. 46 Presumably, a party's diligent effort would uncover any material fraud. Thus, parties to a contract have some ability 37. For instance, the fine bifurcation between the two is less clear in quasi-contractual, equitable theories such as promissory estoppel because those theories have developed in both tort and contract jurisprudence. This theoretically, of course, would lead to a less rigorous exercise of equity jurisdiction on the basis that the courts will only invoke equity jurisdiction to help those who have done everything possible to help themselves. 48 In contrast, classic tort plaintiffs do not always possess this ability. 49 For instance, if a plaintiff is injured by a faulty widget produced by the defendant and used by a third party, then the plaintiff lacked the ability to investigate for undercapitalization, and, thus, the plaintiff's claim for the exercise of equity jurisdiction is presumably better.
Notwithstanding this seemingly sound theoretical argument, empirical studies do not indicate that courts actually apply this model on the average. 50 Rather, contrary to what one might think, courts most frequently pierce in contract cases. 51 Nevertheless, the distinction still plays some role in which factors a court deems important in a piercing analysis. 52 For instance, in contract cases, undercapitalization is largely ignored, 53 while in tort cases, undercapitalization is generally deemed important. 54 Thus, in terms of application, the distinction between the two types of cases tends to focus on the element of injustice.
B. Horizontal Versus Vertical Piercing Cases
In contrast with the dichotomy between tort and contract cases-a dichotomy that affects all piercing cases-the distinction between horizontal and vertical piercing cases only affects a small subclass of piercing cases-a plaintiff seeks to pierce through one corporation that possesses some relationship with another corporation.
Horizontal piercing involves a plaintiff's attempt to pierce the veil of one subsidiary to reach the assets of another subsidiary who shares a will not interfere on behalf of one alleging fraud where the person relying on the misrepresentation had an opportunity to prevent any injury by due diligence."); Watt, supra note 18, at 872-73 ("Typically, in contract claims, . . . the plaintiff must prove a higher degree of culpability . . . than in a tort case for the court to pierce the corporate veil because the plaintiff has sufficient information to make an informed choice . . . before entering the transaction.").
49. 
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parent corporation. 55 Thus, for example, imagine corporation A, a parent corporation, owns shares in three subsidiary corporations, B, C, and D, each of whom produce different types of widgets. A horizontal piercing claim would involve a plaintiff attempting to pierce the veil of B to attack the assets of C. If this process were drawn, as in Figure 1 , then, the plaintiff would literally be attempting to simultaneously attack two corporations of equal power within the larger corporate hierarchy-thus, the term horizontal. The phrase vertical piercing evolved from the same visual notions. Vertical piercing occurs when a plaintiff attempts to pierce through the corporate shield of a subsidiary to reach the assets of a parent. 56 Thus, in the example above, a plaintiff would be attempting to pierce the corporate shield of B to reach the assets of A. In contrast with horizontal piercing, the plaintiff is no longer attempting to pierce two corporations of equal power within the hierarchy of the corporate structure. Rather, the plaintiff is now attempting to pierce an inferior corporate entity-a subsidiary-in an attempt to reach the assets of a superior corporate entity-the parent. If drawn, as in Figure 2 , the plaintiff would literally draw a piercing line upwards-hence, the name. In terms of application, courts tend to focus their inquiry on control or unity factors when analyzing horizontal and vertical piercing cases and deemphasize injustice elements.
57
C. Reverse Piercing Cases
Reverse piercing cases can occur as an overlay of any of the types of piercing cases discussed above, as reverse piercing is an attempt by a plaintiff to pierce a shareholder-or, in the case of a multicorporate structure, a superior-to reach the assets of an inferior. 58 Thus, in the common corporate context where there is a single corporate entity and a number of shareholders, a reverse pierce would be an attempt by the plaintiff to pierce through the shareholder to reach the assets of the corporation.
59 This is demonstrated in Figure 3 . In terms of application, as with horizontal and vertical piercing cases, courts tend to emphasize the control and unity elements and deemphasize the injustice elements. In addition, some have argued this type of piercing should only be available in contractual misrepresentation cases.
61
D. Triangular Piercing Cases
Triangular piercing cases are the most complicated of the piercing structures, as they potentially entail all of the hallmarks of the above structures with a twist-triangular piercing cases can arise from tort or contract cases, have elements of horizontal and vertical structures, and involve reverse piercing.
62
Triangular piercing cases exist where a plaintiff attempts to pierce a parent corporation to reach a shareholder of the parent, in an attempt to reach an otherwise unrelated corporation of which the shareholder owns an interest. 63 Thus, imagine a parent company, A, is solely owned by a shareholder, B. Furthermore, imagine that B owns shares in an unrelated corporation, C. Now imagine that while the plaintiff has only dealt with A and B, the plaintiff has had no direct relationship with C. Nevertheless, both A and B are insolvent. Thus, the plaintiff seeks to pierce A to reach B to reach C, as Figure 5 demonstrates. This, of course, forms a triangle, giving rise to the name. In terms of application, as with horizontal, vertical, and reverse piercing cases, courts tend to emphasize the control and unity elements and deemphasize the injustice elements. 64 In addition, some have argued this type of piercing should only be available in contractual misrepresentation cases. 65 
III. PREDICTABILITY AND CONSISTENCY AS GOALS OF MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
The concepts of predictability and consistency are said to have first arisen on a mandatory basis, at least in England, in the Magna Carta.
66
While the Magna Carta was designed to limit the power of the king, as opposed to the powers of democratic governments, its ideals of nonarbitrary government action have nonetheless formed the essential basis of our modern democratic system 67 and have worked their way into some of the most prominent documents in the United States.
68 While predictability and consistency have certainly formed the basis for larger discussions about all of our governmental branches, 69 ; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.").
71. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 272 (stating that stare decisis plays "an important role in orderly adjudication . . . [and] serves the broader societal interests in evenhanded, consistent, and predictable application of legal rules").
72 Thus, predictability and consistency in this realm encourages citizens to conduct business, leading to a more viable economy. 84 Inversely, unpredictability and inconsistency discourage business by generating a lack of reliance. Notwithstanding this obvious truth, these integral twin principles do not exist in the piercing doctrine. 85 Instead, as stated earlier, the piercing doctrine operates in a factually 75 . Healy, supra note 72, at 75; Rehnquist, supra note 73, at 348. 76. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) ("To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them . 82. Healy, supra note 72, at 109. 83. Peters, supra note 78, at 2039; Rehnquist, supra note 73, at 348; see also Miller, supra note 4, at 112 ("The degree of judicial discretion surrounding the law of entity recognition poses a distinct challenge to the business planner in search of predictability in the law.").
84. Healy, supra note 72, at 108; Parker, supra note 77, at 188 ("'Stare decisis provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange their affairs with confidence. Stare decisis serves to take the capricious element out of the law and give stability to a society. It is a strong tie which the future has to the past.'" (quoting William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949))).
85. Huss, supra note 3, at 110 (noting the principle is arbitrary in its application).
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intensive vacuum that is wholly removed from traditional notions of stare decisis.
86
The crux of the problem has been, then, to create a system that preserves the fundamental notions of fairness entangled within the piercing doctrine, while attempting to achieve some level of predictability and consistency with its application. That problem has proven a tough beast to slay because the current piercing formulations provide an extraordinary degree of discretion to the judiciary. Nevertheless, a number of scholars have proposed a variety of mechanisms to alleviate the predictability and consistency problem.
IV. PROPOSALS BY OTHER SCHOLARS
A number of proposals already exist to remedy the predictability and consistency problems the doctrine currently generates. Generally, two types of theories exist, each respectively focusing on either abolishing the doctrine altogether or alleviating the doctrine's more inhospitable characteristics through codification of a more stringent test. All of these proposals suffer from deficiencies.
A. Proposals Advocating Elimination of the Doctrine
The first category of proposals attempts to eliminate the piercing doctrine. Three prominent theories exist for elimination of the doctrine: (1) the Bainbridge Proposal, 87 (2) the Mandatory Insurance Proposal, and (3) the Mandatory Capitalization Proposal. 88 
The Bainbridge Proposal
Professor Bainbridge has been an outspoken critic of the piercing doctrine and has explicitly advocated its abolition for two reasons. First, he posits that the doctrine is unprincipled and uncontrollable. 89 Second, he argues the doctrine has predictability costs without serving any policy goals. Rather, veil-piercing tests are composed of a variety of factors that a court, retrospectively, will review to determine whether piercing is appropriate. 92 This obviously leads to uncertainty and unpredictability from a corporate planning perspective.
93
Exacerbating the problem, Professor Bainbridge argues, courts frequently seize on one aspect of the factors test and consider it dispositive, even when that aspect, standing alone, is simply a common virtue of even legitimate corporations.
94
As to the second reason, Professor Bainbridge argues that this unpredictability has social costs without any social benefit. 95 The social costs, of course, are inconsistency, unpredictability, the potential for overcapitalization and, thus, reduction in liquidity, difficulty in advising clients prospectively, difficulty in planning from the client's perspective, and general undermining of limited liability.
96
In terms of social benefits, Professor Bainbridge does not believe veil piercing serves any. 97 Rather, because its application is unprincipled, he believes it could not serve any of the social benefits typically discussed as the policy basis supporting its existence-serving as a valve release for excessive externalization. 98 Furthermore, Professor Bainbridge argues the injustice purportedly prevented by the piercing doctrine is actually equally preventable using existing causes of action-misrepresentation, fraud, and fraudulent transfer.
99
For the most part, Professor Bainbridge is correct-current veilpiercing jurisprudence is extremely unprincipled and wildly unpredictable. Furthermore, existing causes of action can serve the majority of the doctrine's effects and policy goals. Nevertheless, eliminating veil piercing has costs to the legitimate policy goals. Furthermore, while existing causes of action are sufficient to serve most areas of potential abuse, existing causes of action are nonetheless insufficient in the context of undercapitalization. First and foremost, piercing serves a deterrent goal. Second, piercing serves as a valve release for the extreme inequitable aspects of limited liability. As to the first, while the estimation is not easily susceptible to concrete proof, the intuitive notion seems unequivocal. The potential of piercing causes shareholders to act differently than they would if piercing did not exist. 101 Thus, for example, shareholders less frequently undercapitalize than they otherwise would for fear of exposure to piercing. Or shareholders of close corporations have greater incentives to watch each other to prevent fraud. Of course, one could argue, somewhat in line with Professor Bainbridge's second argument, 102 that these causes of action already exist in one form or another, and, thus, piercing is simply duplicative. In terms of deterrence, however, piercing still serves an independent goal. The fear of exposing one's personal assets to a judgment in part serves an overdeterrence goal analogous to that of punitive damages-it not only removes the financial incentives, creating a "break even" scenario, it also provides exposure over and above what the corporation might have actually sustained, making inequitable conduct a poor business decision.
103
For example, imagine a corporation, A, is owned by shareholders B, C, and D. Imagine further that B engages in fraud against E, and E later sues, seeking to pierce. While E could certainly sue A and B for fraud even absent piercing, E's recovery would be limited to funds available from A and B. With the addition of piercing, however, C and D are now potentially personally liable as well, creating an incentive to "watch the store" and prevent such activity.
Or imagine a circumstance where a corporation is constantly undercapitalized and is subsequently sued. While fraudulent transfer laws certainly permit "reach backs" for previous transfers, they only permit a plaintiff to access funds that were in fact fraudulently transferred. Thus, financial incentives could still exist for a corporation to undercapitalize because, even if successful, a plaintiff would only conveyance would not, however, reach all of the cases in which shareholders have used limited liability in ways that offend public policy. As argued above, shareholders who cause the corporation to incur debt while knowing that repayment is impossible or highly unlikely arguably should be treated differently from those whose corporations default despite their good faith efforts to manage the business in a financially responsible manner.").
101 recover the amounts of the transfers. Additionally, given the likelihood of the plaintiff's failure and the likelihood of never being sued, undercapitalizing could still make good fiscal sense in a cost-benefit analysis. That perspective, however, is at least less true when shareholders are faced with the possibility of personal liability exceeding that which the corporation could have ever been solvent to pay in the first place. Once overdeterrence enters the cost-benefit analysis, it could not only remove the financial incentives, it could cause the pendulum to shift in the other direction. Finally, although piercing is rare and currently unprincipled, 104 its rarity still likely bears some deterrent effect for people quite simply act differently when no risk exists than when some risk exists. More importantly, the deterrent effect could be enhanced through making application of the piercing doctrine more predictable. In other words, courts should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. Rather, they should just get new water.
Furthermore, in part responding to Professor Bainbridge's first reason and in part responding to his second reason, piercing does serve as a valve release in circumstances where existing causes of action would not.
For instance, imagine a corporation "accidentally" grossly undercapitalizes such that the corporation is not within the reach of fraudulent transfer laws. 105 Imagine further there is no classic siphoning, and the only equitable basis for seeking funds outside the corporate assets is premised on the corporation's failure to properly capitalizethere is no basis for a cause of action for misrepresentation, fraud, and so on. This is one of many circumstances piercing was intended to prevent. That is, piercing is intended to mitigate some of the more extreme aspects of limited liability and serve as a mechanism for plaintiffs to achieve a remedy where a corporation has failed to act legitimately.
106
While academics and courts can certainly disagree on when it is appropriate to pierce, it is difficult for anyone to admit there are not at least some circumstances wherein piercing should be permitted. 106. See, e.g., Ballantine, supra note 19, at 19 (stating the test is whether the corporation used the corporation in good faith for legitimate ends); Presser, supra note 4, at 407 ("It is, or at least once was and ought again to be, hornbook law that a shareholder or a parent corporation should not lose the protection of limited liability unless that shareholder or parent has somehow 'abused' the corporate form.").
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In the final analysis, the piercing doctrine, as currently conceived and applied, is unpredictable, inconsistent, and at least lackluster at achieving its stated goals. However, a better test would achieve better results.
The Mandatory Insurance Proposal
While adherents to the mandatory insurance proposals have not specifically noted that elimination of the doctrine is a goal, 107 the concept behind the proposal is in the nature of a replacement-a mechanism designed to eliminate the need for piercing doctrine altogether, using insurance as a vehicle.
The concept behind the mandatory insurance argument is that a corporation, as a matter of legislative requirement, should always carry "sufficient" insurance. 108 While this remedy certainly could create more predictability and consistency than existing piercing doctrine, at least as far as the theories have come, there does not appear to be any objective link that a corporation could use to "know" how much insurance to have. Nevertheless, the corporation would presumably need to discern the nature of its activities, the foreseeable-and sometimes less foreseeable-potential harms of its activities, the potential damage amounts for those activities, and other possible considerations. Again, at least as far as the theories have come, the corporation seemingly would need to know these things in a vacuum-untethered to any objective criteria or external information to assist with the decision-making process. Additionally, to the extent the mandate arose as a specific number or calculus promulgated by a legislative body, such a theory would require a legislative body to account for the various types of existing industries, the various types of potential industries, the potential harms those industries could create, and the types of damages those harms could create. 109 Needless to say, this is a tall order that would come with substantial prospective costs. This premise again needs no proof to sustain it because its intuitive roots are so strikingly clear. Insurance, in the first instance, is intended to create a sense of safety in the insured. 112 That safety derives from the notion that the insured has engaged in risk-sharing with the insurance company. 113 In the case of the insured's risk, the ultimate payment is made prospectively through a premium; thus, the insured's risk is disgorged each month. That, of course, is not true of the insurance company. This creates a situation where, at any given moment, the risk as to both parties is asymmetrical, even if the risk is ultimately evenly shared over time.
In the context of a piercing case, shareholders who are most likely to get pierced are those who play "fast and loose" with their corporate structure under the presumable notion that getting pierced is statistically unlikely. If insurance were mandatory, those individuals would be further emboldened to engage in even riskier behavior, as their risk of loss would be substantially less and they would have already paid for the privilege of the gamble. While this option would certainly serve to protect would-be plaintiffs from insolvent corporations, it would simply force some corporations to shoulder the burden for others-those corporations who do nothing wrong and are not the target of mandatory insurance would pay enhanced premiums for insurance they do not need to pay as a result of those who game the system by engaging in risky conduct. From a public policy perspective, this result is undesirable. 769, 896 (1999) ("Insurance is usually described as one party's agreement to suffer a certain but relatively small loss (i.e., the premium payment) in return for obtaining the insurer's agreement to cover the possibility of contingent but larger losses.").
113. Id.
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The concept behind mandatory capitalization is somewhat similar to the underlying notion behind mandatory insurance, with one exception: the origin of the fund maintained for would-be plaintiffs. 114 As explained above, in the context of mandatory insurance, the fund is derived from insurance. In the context of mandatory capitalization, however, the funds derive from the corporation itself. 115 The fund is then kept as retained earnings available in the event of liability.
116
In many ways, mandatory capitalization theories suffer from the same types of criticisms seen in mandatory insurance schemes. 117 Thus, a legislative body, to determine the appropriate amount, would need to account for the various types of existing industries, the various types of potential industries, the potential harms those industries could create, and the types of damages those harms could create, among other considerations.
118
At least as far as the theories have come, these decisions would be made presumably using traditional mechanisms like actuarial models. As stated earlier, the costs for such an activity would be great. 119 Admittedly, my test uses latent elements of mandatory capitalization. But, instead of using traditional actuarial models, which have substantial prospective costs, my test uses the doctrine of custom, described in more detail in the next Part. In addition, my test includes other elements of a conjunctive test-elements that would not substantially alter existing piercing doctrine while substantially making the test more objective.
B. Codification Requiring Fraud or Siphoning and Insolvency
The second category of proposals attempts to create predictability and consistency through the creation of a conjunctive test. By far, the 114 On the positive side, this proposal is moving in the proper direction. That is, instead of attempting to eliminate the doctrine altogether, the proposal seeks to limit judicial discretion through the vehicle of a conjunctive test. Nevertheless, the proposal falls short in two respects. First, the proposal requires the existence of either fraud or siphoning to the exclusion of undercapitalization. As discussed below in Part V, undercapitalization is a necessary option for piercing if the judicial system is to preserve the purpose of piercing doctrine-prevention of injustice.
Second, the proposal lacks a unity element in its codification. 124 While the unity element has been widely criticized as markedly unrelated to any equitable basis for piercing, the unity requirement ensures that not every shareholder could be personally liable for the corporate debts. Rather, only those shareholders who are truly controlling the corporation and using it improperly would be subject to that type of liability. Imagine for example that corporation A has two shareholders, B and C. Imagine that C is a completely passive shareholder who takes no interest in the day-to-day operations of A. Imagine further that B completely controls A and uses A as an alter ego, instrumentality, or any other creative metaphor. If a plaintiff sued A and successfully pierced, both B and C would have potential exposure because without the unity requirement, every shareholder of a corporation, however passive, would be exposed to piercing. In this circumstance, piercing doctrine would create more inequity than it was 120. Matheson & Eby, supra note 8, at 181-93. 121. Id. at 184. 122. Id. 123. Id. As discussed in Part IV, the insolvency requirement is a concept inherent in the doctrine itself. Thus, properly viewed, Matheson and Eby's proposal simply argues that the doctrine should be applied when and only when a demonstration of fraud or siphoning exists. The proposal does not contemplate any other necessary conduct for application of the doctrine.
124. The proposed statute includes a comment indicating passive owners are not personally liable. Id. at 186. Nevertheless, given the proposed statute's language, passive owners who receive insolvency distributions could be exposed to a piercing claim, assuming the passive owners "knew that the Limited Liability Entity was insolvent or should have reasonably foreseen that the Insolvency Distribution would render Insolvent the Limited Liability Entity . . . ." Id. Given that any shareholder has knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the corporation's finances, this portion of the proposed statute effectively eliminates the unity requirement.
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Thus, while the Matheson & Eby Proposal certainly creates more predictability and consistency in the application of the piercing doctrine, it does so at the expense of the doctrine itself-it compromises the doctrine's ability to achieve the purpose of preventing injustice.
V. A PROPOSAL
While the twin goals of predictability and consistency are important, or should be, to the proper administration of the law, most academics and judges would agree that both must be sacrificed in those rare instances where those goals are in direct conflict with the goal of justice. While the piercing doctrine has certainly been viewed in that light for the course of its existence, the doctrine need not remain so unanchored to both achieve its goal of justice and provide predictability and consistency.
It is with this context that a new test, if adopted, would mitigate the problems of unpredictability and inconsistency generated by the overabundance of judicial discretion in the piercing doctrine. The piercing doctrine should become a static, conjunctive test that requires the following: (1) an injustice requirement that can be achieved through a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, or undercapitalization; (2) a unity requirement; (3) a causation requirement; and (4) an insolvency requirement.
A. Piercing Should Require Evidence of Injustice
While some courts certainly require the existence of some injustice element before piercing, many do not. 125 Further, even among those that require an element of injustice, few courts specifically and explicitly require that a plaintiff demonstrate specific types of injustice. 126 Instead, courts have produced an incredibly broad definition of injustice that requires nothing even remotely close to an actual standard. 127 In some instances, this broad definitional structure has permitted courts to pierce 125 . See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 865 ("[R]ecent opinions state that meeting the impermissible domination and control element can, in itself, justify piercing.").
126. See Presser, supra note 4, at 412 ("It is usually understood that to pierce the corporate veil some sort of abuse is required, but there is no consensus on what constitutes 'abuse.'").
127. This solves three problems. First, a static injustice requirement ensures that the shareholder or entity is in fact engaging in behavior that piercing should attempt to prevent-the use of limited liability as an absolute shield for injustice. 133 Thus, in addition to creating external consistency, it creates consistency with the goals of the doctrine. Second, and further elaborating on the goal of the doctrine, the introduction of an actual harm requirement will prevent piercing on the mere basis that unity and insolvency exist. Finally, creating set, stable types of injustice will encourage both internal and external consistency because it will prevent individual judges from simply checking their guts to see if something unjust has occurred.
In terms of predictability and consistency, the first two of these injustice tests-fraud 134 result, while other jurisdictions will disregard the corporate entity based only on a finding of excessive unity of interest alone."). While unity is certainly an important element to a piercing claim, its sufficiency to pierce absent harm makes little sense, as there is no doubting that close corporations will nearly always meet the test. Furthermore, as I will discuss later, insolvency is a necessary precondition to piercing in the first instance. Thus, in terms of discerning whether a corporation should be pierced, it adds little to the analysis. rely on definitions already jurisprudentially well-worn. That is, fraud and misrepresentation are already fairly static concepts both within jurisdictions and between jurisdictions. Accordingly, rather than try to revamp those systems, which seem to be working well, courts should incorporate these traditional definitions into the piercing test in their existing forms. 136 The final option in the test, however, is not as easily defined. The element of undercapitalization has proven to be one of the more difficult problems in the existing piercing doctrine, at least in terms of predictability and consistency. This truth is largely a result of the fact that few people could readily discern what it means to be undercapitalized from a corporate perspective.
Why Undercapitalization Is Important
A number of scholars have questioned, implicitly or explicitly, the prudence of continuing to permit piercing on the basis of undercapitalization without a showing of further injustice. 137 This largely stems from the notion that limited liability is, in the first instance, a means to shelter financial resources, and undercapitalization is simply a tool to further that goal. 138 Furthermore, capitalization, through retained earnings, limits financial resources and liquidity of the entity. 139 Finally, concerns have perennially existed over what moment in time would serve as the basis for undercapitalization 140 and what mechanism would be 135. Generally, the elements of fraud and misrepresentation are similar. See 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 77 (2008) ("The difference between intentional or fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation is that the latter only requires that the statement or omission was made without a reasonable basis for believing its truthfulness, rather than an actual knowledge of its falsity.").
136. This is somewhat of a change, as courts do not typically apply these tests stringently in piercing cases. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 57 (2004) ("Under the particular circumstances of the case, a showing of moral culpability, in addition to other factors, is often necessary to justify disregarding a corporate entity, although it has been said that proof of plain fraud is not a necessary element in a finding to disregard the corporate entity.").
137. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 521 ("To be sure, undercapitalization is one of the factors courts commonly consider, which may result in personal liability, when taken in conjunction with the factors we discussed earlier, but it is not enough standing alone to pierce the corporate veil."); Presser, supra note 4, at 413 ("The better reasoned cases do suggest that it is unlikely that undercapitalization alone is enough to remove the shield of limited liability."); see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 1064 (stating piercing occurs in seventy-three percent of cases where undercapitalization is also present).
138. used to discern what constituted adequate capitalization. Each of these concerns is discussed below. Undercapitalization has long served as a basis for piercing the corporate veil, particularly for cases arising in tort. 141 That corporations are in fact engaging in a type of injustice by operating with insufficient means to pay foreseeable plaintiffs for foreseeable injuries stemming from the corporation's ordinary activities has served as an underlying notion for permitting undercapitalization as a means for piercing. 142 Thus, assuming undercapitalization exists, it is a mechanism used by corporations in combination with limited liability statutes to completely protect all assets from recovery by potential plaintiffs-in effect, both the corporation and the shareholders constantly remain judgment proof.
Given the traditional notions of equity-every wrong deserves a remedy 143 -it is obvious why undercapitalization necessarily could create circumstances of injustice. For instance, imagine corporation A sells blasting caps-small, explosive devices regularly used in mining activities. Imagine further that A knows that a particular set of blasting caps are especially dangerous due to some defect in their production. Rather than ceasing to sell that set of blasting caps, A decides to continue selling them while enacting a corporate policy of regularly paying out all earnings in dividends. Years after all of the caps are sold and A has paid out all of the dividends, B is injured by one of the caps and sues A. While B may win on liability and damages, A is insolvent to pay the claims, and, thus, B is out in the cold. 144 likely to flow from its operations generally is insufficient to pierce the corporate veil."), with Harvey Gelb, Piercing the Corporate Veil-The Undercapitalization Factor, 59 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1, 4 (1983) ("Courts cannot focus solely on initial corporate capital or assets, as some are prone to do, in deciding whether inadequacy of assets warrants a decision to pierce because subsequent changes, such as increased hazards or reduced assets, may render a determination as to initial inadequacy irrelevant.").
141. Campbell, supra note 14, at 39 ("Corporate undercapitalization is often a factor in a court's decision to disregard the corporate entity."); Presser, supra note 4, at 413 ("The most commonly targeted abuse or 'injustice' seems to be the failure adequately to capitalize the corporation, to operate it in a manner where the corporation's assets will not be sufficient to meet the obligations to creditors."); Thompson, supra note 3, at 1065; see also Millon, supra note 8, at 1336-37 ("Courts have occasionally stated that [undercapitalization] is a sufficient basis for veil piercing.").
142. Gelb, supra note 140, at 3. 143. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Actions § 35 (2005) ("It is a principle of the common law that whenever the law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy.").
144. While it could be argued that a plaintiff could reach assets using either 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2007), or state fraudulent transfer statutes, plaintiffs attempting to use those forms of relief must prove an intent prong. While that prong could be much easier to prove in a context where a corporation maintains a level of constant insolvency, relief under those mechanisms is not necessarily likely in a scenario where the corporation is not actually aware of potential creditors and is seemingly solvent but is nonetheless unreasonably capitalized given the type of business. Furthermore, fraudulent transfer actions only permit a plaintiff to attack funds actually transferred-
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While some would argue this is the necessary fallout of limited liability statutes, it need not be so. The piercing doctrine was created in the first instance to remedy these exact types of problems by permitting plaintiffs to seek recompense from otherwise protected shareholders, entities, or both, notwithstanding the otherwise strict prohibition of the statute. 145 The goal is to serve traditional notions of fairness while still achieving the purpose of limited liability in those circumstances when corporations are in fact behaving legitimately. 146 Thus, permitting undercapitalization as a basis of injustice for purposes of a piercing test serves a number of goals. First, it is consistent with traditional notions of equity jurisprudence; it is not a large shift in the law that would potentially create unforeseeable ripple effects. Second, it prohibits the type of patently unfair conduct described above. Finally, it acts as a deterrent device, providing negative incentives for corporations to adequately capitalize.
Defining Undercapitalization
The remaining, and more difficult question, is how to define the flashpoint when a corporation moves from being capitalized to being undercapitalized. This necessarily involves two interrelated questions.
First, at what moment will capitalization be analyzed, and second, what does it mean to be undercapitalized? 147 As to the first, only one moment is relevant to our discussion of capitalization-the moment a corporation is legally required to pay a judgment. If the corporation is solvent at that moment, then piercing is unnecessary. If the corporation is insolvent at the moment, then further they do not permit a plaintiff to attack a corporate shareholder's personal funds to the extent those personal funds are not a portion of the transfer. See id. While this perhaps seems legally intuitive, permitting a plaintiff to attack a corporate shareholder's personal funds serves a goal of deterrence analogous to that of punitive damages. That is, the availability of additional liability in this circumstance eliminates the economic incentives that could otherwise exist. Cf. Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating overdeterrence is a goal of punitive damages because it eliminates what could otherwise be a positive cost-benefit analysis).
145. See, e.g., Ballantine, supra note 19, at 19 (stating the test is whether the corporation used the corporation in good faith for legitimate ends); Presser, supra note 4, at 407 ("It is, or at least once was and ought again to be, hornbook law that a shareholder or a parent corporation should not lose the protection of limited liability unless that shareholder or parent has somehow 'abused' the corporate form.").
146. See sources cited supra note 145. 147. Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 888-89 (stating the difficult questions raised by undercapitalization are what is capital, when is it measured, and how much is enough). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
analysis is necessary to discern whether the corporation is ripe for piercing. No other moment is probative.
148
At first blush, this notion seems potentially counterintuitive because judging a corporation on a singular moment to determine whether its capitalization was legitimate ignores a number of other potentially probative facts that lead to inevitable "what ifs." For example, what if the corporation were capitalized adequately, but immediately before the judgment, an unforeseeable natural disaster occurs? Although these doomsday scenarios seemingly cause pause, the fundamental question deals with them nonetheless-the ultimate inquiry in any piercing case is to determine whether a corporation acted legitimately like a separate entity intending to continue business.
149
So then, what does a legitimate corporation do when faced with the future potential of legal liability? Initially, a legitimate corporation would probably attempt to discern whether legal liability exists, the extent of the legal liability, and what funds, if any, exist to pay a potential judgment. If a legitimate corporation then believed liability existed, a legitimate corporation would begin holding reserves, either through its income in the ordinary course or by sheltering existing retained earnings to ultimately pay what could become the judgment. Thus, by the time a legitimate corporation could become exposed to a 148. Courts have routinely analyzed undercapitalization at the moment of the entity's inception. Campbell, supra note 14, at 41 ("One problem in undercapitalization cases that has troubled both commentators and judges is the determination of the point in time at which undercapitalization is measured. Language from cases generally indicates that the critical time is that of incorporation."); Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 889; Mendelson, supra note 105, at 1262, 1264; Presser, supra note 4, at 413-14 ("Some courts have expanded this requirement of initial adequate capitalization into an obligation to continue to finance the corporation such that its capital remains adequate to meet anticipated obligations. The wiser jurisdictions maintain that the 'undercapitalization' question should be asked only for the time of incorporation."). Contra DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 688 (4th Cir. 1976) (supporting the notion that the obligation to adequately capitalize is a continuing obligation that exists after formation); Gelb, supra note 140, at 4 ("Courts cannot focus solely on initial corporate capital or assets, as some are prone to do, in deciding whether inadequacy of assets warrants a decision to pierce because subsequent changes, such as increased hazards or reduced assets, may render a determination as to initial inadequacy irrelevant."). Analyzing undercapitalization only at the time of formation is myopic. For example, imagine corporation A forms for the purpose of selling widgets with initial capitalization of one million dollars. Presumably, at this point, A would be solvent for any claims arising from its formation. However, imagine further that A subsequently retains no earnings and, after several years, commits some action giving rise to tort liability. While the corporation followed the theoretical law in this instance, the theoretical law was insufficient to serve the goal-to create some mechanism for payment of liabilities when the entity is otherwise insolvent. Rather, the proposal would only necessarily serve the goal at the moment of formation, a moment that would only capture liabilities arising from formation.
149. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
judgment, at the latest, a legitimate corporation would have sufficient funds to pay the judgment.
150
Scholars and practitioners alike may criticize this notion-what if the corporation has gross assets per fiscal year of one million dollars, net assets of $500,000, and potential exposure in a particular piece of litigation up to $700,000? Obviously, this corporation could not raise sufficient funds through retaining earnings to pay the judgment, assuming the judgment was issued in less than two years. The response here is easier than one might think-the corporation should already have retained earnings sheltered for the potential of this type of event. This statement leads to the final inquiry-how much should a legitimate corporation retain as capitalization?
151
This has proven to be the most difficult of questions to answer because each company's answer will be different. That is, a plumbing company might retain less than a chemical manufacturer. A chemical manufacturer might retain less than an explosives manufacturer. An explosives manufacturer might retain less than a nuclear facility. Furthermore, one chemical manufacturer might retain more than another on the basis of business. Thus, a large chemical manufacturer with thousands of clients might retain more than a small chemical manufacturer with three clients. A nuclear facility might retain less because it is located in a rural community as opposed to a metropolitan area.
And so, analytically, retention creates other problems. With too much capitalization, the corporation will unnecessarily limit liquidity. With too little capitalization, the corporation could expose itself to a piercing claim. In the midst of this prospective dilemma is another specter-how can a court decide retrospectively whether a corporation made a legitimate choice? The answer is custom.
Custom, in the context of tort law, is generally defined as the usual manner in which an industry conducts an activity. 152 Courts should incorporate this doctrine as a means to determine whether a corporation sufficiently capitalized itself. Accordingly, when reviewing this element of the test, judges and juries would only review whether the corporation had capitalized in a manner consistent with other corporations of the same industry, size, and general locale. If adopted, the primary benefit of the doctrine is that it eliminates the retrospective guessing of what a corporation should have done-the normative-and thereby eliminates the subjectivity, inconsistency, and lack of predictability that necessarily follow it. eliminates the need for judges, or juries, to become experts in any particular field to determine whether a corporation reasonably capitalized. Rather, judges and juries would need only look to how other similar corporations capitalized.
The remaining problems are those inherent in the doctrine of custom itself. These problems are both practical and theoretical. As to practical, the doctrine raises a number of questions. For example, how does a corporation prove the custom? Will the custom be national, regional, or local? There is necessarily some fluidity here, but a lawyer could prove the custom by proving that a number of other corporations of the same industry, the same comparable size, and the same general locale maintained similar amounts of liquid capital on a day-to-day basis. The ideal scenario would keep the comparative information as close to the locale of the defendant corporation as possible to maintain consistency. Or, if an industry lacks comparable corporations locally or regionally, similar comparisons could be made nationally. 160 Theoretically, the customs doctrine also carries some baggage. Thus, for instance, the most common criticism of custom in the medical malpractice context is that it permits doctors to frame their own exposure to liability.
161 Accordingly, to limit their liability, the customs doctrine could encourage physicians to work in a manner less uniform to other doctors in their field, even when safety would argue for the opposite.
162
In the corporate context, the argument would presumably be that corporations would benefit from the same defect-corporations would uniformly set the standard lower than public policy should require.
While this potential remains, it is unlikely for two reasons. First, it presumes that no corporation would be willing to do more than is required by custom as a means to add greater protection from piercing or as a means to encourage conservative, long-term investment. Second, it presumes that members of any given industry within any given area would come together, conspiratorially, to not only discuss their current level of capitalization but also to discuss where to set the benchmark as a means to defeat piercing claims. This seems chimerical at best. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
B. Piercing Should Maintain an Element of Unity
The unity element of the test is simultaneously the most controversial and the most dangerous from a predictability and consistency perspective. 163 This controversy arises because the majority of the factors in a factors test seek to discern the existence or absence of sufficient unity or control. 164 This has led scholars, in hopes of creating consistency and predictability, to disavow the element altogether. 165 Nevertheless, the unity test is indispensable. 166 Furthermore, courts can revamp the unity test itself to increase predictability and consistency.
The unity test is indispensable because it contains the factors that target specific controlling shareholders and leave passive shareholders safe from the reaches of piercing. 167 For instance, imagine a corporation, A, has three shareholders, B, C, and D, and C and D are true passive investors-capital contributors who have no role in the management or day-to-day operations of the corporation. B is both a shareholder and serves in every officer role for the corporation. If a plaintiff sues A and seeks to pierce A's corporate veil, the suit should not expose C and D to personal liability under any circumstances for they are true passive investors. 168 Nevertheless, if no unity requirement exists, nothing would separate B from C and D.
Once we accept that the unity requirement must exist in some form to maintain any level of fairness within the piercing doctrine, the remaining analysis is whether a formula can be generated that effectively measures unity while promoting predictability and consistency.
At its fundamental base, the unity requirement seeks to determine whether the shareholders use the entity as an extension of self-making decisions or taking actions that are inherently beneficial to the shareholders and not necessarily beneficial to the entity. This is fundamentally another way of asking who controls the entity. Traditional piercing analysis uses the factors test to determine control, reviewing facts such as the treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his or her own, the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records, disregard of legal formalities, the failure to maintain arm's length relationships, and many others.
170
While these factors initially appear relevant and easily operationalized, their application is much more complicated in common examples.
For instance, imagine corporation A has four shareholders, B, C, D, and E. Imagine further that B possesses all officer positions for A, maintains separate personal and corporate monetary accounts, does not maintain proper minutes or corporate records, and has, on several occasions several years ago, engaged in non-arm's-length transactions between himself and the corporation. Finally, imagine C, D, and E are truly passive shareholders. One day, F, the plaintiff, is injured by one of A's products. Reviewing the factors above and assuming piercing was otherwise appropriate, who would have sufficient unity for piercing? Suddenly, the factors stated above seem largely irrelevant. The first factor-whether the shareholders treat the assets of the corporation as their own-isn't really relevant here because even B maintains separate monetary accounts. The second factor-the failure to maintain minutes or corporate records-is certainly present here and thus would presumably provide at least some support for piercing. But against whom would the court pierce? All of the shareholders meet that factor. Does it serve the goal of piercing to expose them all to liability? The third factor-the disregard of legal formalities-has the same problem. It potentially affects all of the shareholders, including the passive ones because it attaches the analysis to actions of the entire entity instead of actions by the individual shareholders. Finally, the fourth factor-the failure to maintain arm's length transactions-seems irrelevant here because it is only potentially applicable to B, but B has not engaged in the conduct in several years. More importantly, the temporally removed conduct is presumably unrelated to F's injuries.
If the touchstone of unity is, or should be, control, then the factors test is untailored for the purpose for it, at most, determines whether an seems clear that control is an essential prerequisite for holding a shareholder liable."); Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 862-63 (describing "two multi-part tests" used to determine "defendant's domination or control over the corporation"); see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 1056 ("The role that the individual plays within a corporation also has an effect on the outcome. . . . [I]n the few cases that characterized potential defendants as passive shareholders rather than active in the business as directors, officers, or otherwise, the courts almost always found no liability.").
170. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 856-57 (describing other factors courts use to determine control of an entity).
entity is ripe for piercing without analyzing whether any individual shareholder is ripe for piercing. Courts should reform the test to analyze whether the shareholder, shareholders, or entity that the plaintiff seeks to pierce individually possesses the ability through percentage of voting shares to make the decision that gave rise to the injustice of undercapitalization. The unity thus becomes tied to the decision as opposed to the corporation.
For instance, imagine a corporation, A, possesses four shareholders, B, C, D, and E. Furthermore, imagine A sells a widget to a third party, F. F is subsequently injured by the widget and sues A. Of course, F thereafter learns that A is insolvent and seeks to pierce A. Which of B, C, D, and E are sufficiently unified to justify piercing? Using traditional analysis, the court would review a number of factors in hopes of determining which of B, C, and D controlled the corporation in general. Of course, the court would also weigh those factors as it saw fit.
171
Under the proposed analysis, only one inquiry would be necessary-who controlled the decision giving rise to the injustice? That, of course, begs the question, which decision? The answer to that question is inherently reliant upon the type of underlying injustice. Thus, for example, if the underlying suit is premised upon fraud, then the decision giving rise to unity would be the decision to misrepresent material facts. The same would be true for misrepresentation. In terms of undercapitalization, the relevant decision would be one to pay dividends or retain earnings in an uncustomary manner.
This formulation has three positives. First, it resolves the need for a complicated factors test to determine a shareholder's unity with the corporation. While determining the unity may require detailed review, determining the control of a decision requires much less. Thus, of course, it encourages the stated goal of limiting discretion and thereby increasing predictability and consistency. Second, this formulation links the conduct giving rise to the liability directly with the plaintiff's claim, which, as discussed below, 172 is preferable from a policy perspective. Finally, this formulation bears sufficient flexibility to be generally applicable to various types of piercing cases. 173. Admittedly, this formulation bears its own flaw. Specifically, there is some discretion for a judge to determine which decision gave rise to liability and which shareholders had control, through their shares, to reach the decision. Thus, in terms of predictability and consistency, the possibility of asymmetric results certainly exists. While admittedly this makes the proposal short of perfect, an ideal state of objectivity in this regard is not possible. Instead, the goal should be to limit judicial discretion as much as possible to enhance the goals of predictability and consistency while not 2011] LIMITING JUDICIAL DISCRETION 227
C. Piercing Should Require Causation
While causation-the requirement that the plaintiff's harm stem from the wrongful conduct of the defendant-is a necessary element to most causes of action, it is not frequently adhered to in piercing cases. 174 In part, this stems from the doctrine's historical roots. That is, the piercing doctrine is not a true sword in the same manner that a cause of action is a sword. Instead, it is only viable upon a plaintiff's showing of breach of an underlying duty, the insolvency of the entity, and the other elements of the doctrine. 175 This has led many courts to view the elements of injustice and unity as entirely separate elements as opposed to elements that must bear a causal relationship. 176 The lack of this requirement goes to the very heart of the philosophical inconsistency with the piercing doctrine. That is, the piercing doctrine is premised upon the idea that it would be unfair to permit a shareholder to hide behind limited liability.
177
Without the causation requirement, though, no unfairness could possibly exist. If the corporation is an empty shell used solely for the purpose of doing the shareholders' bidding, but the harm suffered by the plaintiff bears no relationship to the unity, then the harm, assuming it exists, is unrelated to the manner in which the shareholders conduct the business of the entity. Accordingly, that conduct should not compromise the entity's limited liability shield.
For instance, imagine that corporation A has five shareholders, B, C, D, E, and F. Imagine further that B controls A in every sense of the word and meets all unity requirements. However, C, D, E, and F are true passive investors. Subsequently, B engaged in fraudulent conduct using A as a vehicle for the fraud. Thereafter, A produces a product that harms G, a purchaser of a product. Assume G's harm is wholly unrelated to B's fraudulent activity. Additionally, assume B has not engaged in any compromising the purpose of the test. Any further objectivity by narrowing the specific type of decision would limit the test such that it could not generally apply.
174. This element still exists in many instrumentality formulations. See Caudill, supra note 23, at 465-66. Nevertheless, many courts ignore the requirement. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 862 ("The notion that there ought to be some causal relationship between the fraud or wrong of the defendant, and harm to the plaintiff, is sound, yet, as we have seen above, often forgotten by the courts in piercing cases.").
175. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 47 (2004) ("[Piercing] is a means of assessing liability for the acts of a corporation against an equity holder in the corporation. It is not itself an action but is merely a procedural means of allowing liability on a substantive claim.").
176. This result is logically inconsistent and is the functional equivalent of "holding a driver liable for an accident that occurred in broad daylight because the headlights were not in proper working condition." 179 The causation prong would solve this problem, ensuring that the behavior by the entity, shareholder, or shareholders is the same behavior that gave rise to the plaintiff's harm.
On that basis, piercing should require a plaintiff to prove that the injustice complained of is in fact the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm. 180 This proposal has two positives. First, it solves the logical inconsistency associated with permitting plaintiffs to pierce without demonstrating that the corporation actually engaged in inappropriate conduct related to the plaintiff's harm. Second, it encourages predictable and consistent application of the causation prong by using jurisprudence that is already sufficiently well-worn-standards for actual and proximate cause.
D. Piercing Should Maintain the Element of Insolvency
The existence of an insolvency requirement is not an actual alteration to the law. 181 Rather, it would simply solidify the element within the test. Nevertheless, the element is a necessary component of the test because it prevents compromising an entity's limited liability shield except where necessary to serve the dictates of equity.
Although limited liability exists statutorily for incorporated entities in every jurisdiction in the United States, 182 the piercing doctrine is not a legislative exception to most of those statutes. piercing doctrine is not an independent statutory cause of action in most jurisdictions. 184 Instead, the piercing doctrine is a judicial exception created through the court's equity powers. 185 Equity is arguably the oldest type of jurisdiction, as it derives from the king. 186 Before the existence of courts in England, the king was the original and final arbiter of all disputes. 187 Thus, the king's jurisdiction was unlimited and completely subject to his own sense of fairness.
188 As the number of disputes grew, however, the king was increasingly incapable of hearing them all. 189 Thus, the king began slowly divesting judicial responsibilities to others who were charged with carrying out his will.
190 His position, then, became solely one of ratification or appellate review-again, accordingly to his own sense of fairness.
191
As the number of petitions continued to grow, the king began delegating authority to Parliament to hear the petitions; Parliament, at least at the time, sat as a sessional body called only for specific purposes.
192 Thereafter, Parliament began delegating authority to hear the petitions to various bodies, ultimately leading to the dichotomy between courts of equity and courts of law. 193 Following the split of law and equity, the common law courts and equity courts reached a compromise on their jurisdictions. 194 Specifically, jurisdiction in the equity courts would not exist unless and until a plaintiff had exhausted all legal remedies in the common law courts. 195 The insolvency requirement is simply a corollary to this basic compromise. Thus, plaintiffs are required to seek recompense at law prior to seeking recompense in equity.
196
Maintaining this element is both practically and theoretically sound. Practically, there is no reason to pierce a corporation's liability shield if the corporation is solvent. For instance, imagine A, a corporation, KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 engages in fraud against B, and B sues, seeking piercing as a remedy. Assuming A is solvent for the debts and for the liability, if any, arising from the litigation, courts will not permit B to pierce. Rather, B will be required to seek recompense only from A. This makes sense because none of the shareholders were parties to the contract and A is, in fact, solvent. Theoretically, this requirement is consistent with traditional equity jurisprudence because it limits piercing actions to only those situations where no remedy at law exists-situations where the corporation is judgment-proof.
VI. CONCLUSION
For all of the criticisms levied at the piercing doctrine, it is unequivocal that it serves a valid goal-to protect plaintiffs against true inequity. Nevertheless, as currently constructed, the piercing doctrine is the archetype of mechanisms permitting unwieldy judicial discretion and thus inconsistency and a lack of predictability in judgments. As a result, the move towards a conjunctive, objective test is necessary for the doctrine to continue holding an analytically legitimate place in the fabric of the law. Without some cabining, however, the doctrine is exposed to seemingly credible attacks to its very existence.
